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Abstract
Network structure has a significant role in determining the outcomes
of many socio-economic relationships, including the antagonistic ones. In
this paper we study a situation in which agents, embedded in a network,
simultaneously play interrelated bilateral contest games with their neighbours. Spillovers between contests induce complex local and global network effects. We first characterize the equilibrium of a game on arbitrary
fixed network. Then we study a dynamic network formation model, introducing a novel but intuitive link formation protocol. As links represent
antagonistic relationships, link formation is unilateral while link destruction is bilateral. A complete k-partite network is the unique stable network
topology. As a result, the model provides a micro-foundation for the structural balance concept in social psychology, and the main results go in line
with theoretical and empirical findings from other disciplines, including
international relations, sociology and biology.
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Introduction

There are a number of situations where agents are involved in some kind of
contest or conflict. In these situations agents can increase the probability of
favourable outcome of the process by means of certain costly actions, such as
investment in weapons, bribing judges/politicians, hiring lawyers, etc. An agent
does not always compete with just one opponent, but rather with several different
opponents simultaneously. The contests that an agent is involved into can be,
and often are, related (i.e. an agent spends same costly resources for each contest)
which creates spillovers.
The environment of interest in language of networks can be described as a
network G = G(N, L) in which link gij ∈ L between two agents i and j indicate
the presence of this type of (negative) relation. We focus on the relations that
can be described as (bilateral) contests. Informally, a contest is an interaction in
which players exert costly effort in order to extract resources from other player
(transferable contest); or receive a larger share of pie to be divided. In the paper
we shall focus on the first case, and briefly discuss the second in section 8.
To illustrate a type of interaction we are interested, let us consider a case of
patent litigation and antitrust disputes. The U.S. Federal District Courts has
registered about 10 000 antitrust and 29 000 patent infringement cases from 2000
to 2010. These types of litigations have consequences for both conflicting parties.
The plaintiff argues for forcing another company to refrain from injurious acts
and punishments as large as tree times the economic damages sustained. On
the other hand, a plaintiff risks being counter-sued and even loosing rights to
its intellectual property. The costs of litigation are very high, reaching more
that 5 millions USD per lawsuit, excluding damages and royalties (Rea, 2009).
The transfers to be paid reach sums which are considerably higher (Sytch and
Tatarynowicz, 2013). The firms can be, and usually are, involved in more than
one such process at the same time. Other examples include international conflict,
patent races, lobbying, Massive Multi-player Role Playing Games(MMORPG),
school violence etc.
We first study a model on a fixed network, and then focus on the network formation. In context described above, agents can form both positive links (friendship) and negative links (antagonism, contest, conflict). We focus on the negative
links in the paper, and positive links are interpreted as a (self enforcing) commitment by both agents not to engage in a contest. A negative link indicates that
agents play a bilateral contest game. Thus the model combines network forma2
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Figure 1: Strong structural Balance, (Easley and Kleinberg, 2010)
tion and game on a network. With changes of the network structure, the effort
that players devote in each particular contest will in general change. Thus, in
the dynamic model of network formation, we study coupled evolution of network
topology and play on the network.
Results of the formation model have important implications for the structural balance theory from social psychology. The concept of (strong) structural
balance, originated by (Heider, 1946), applies to situations in which relations
between agents can be either negative (antagonistic)or positive (friendship). It
states that groups of three agents, the only socially and psychologically stable
structures are those in which all three agents are friends (all links are positive)
or two of them are friends with third as a common enemy (one positive and
two negative links). So, a friendship relation is transitive. Figure 1 graphically
illustrates Heider’s theory.
As it is defined, the structural balance can be seen as a local property of
a network. The natural question is what are the global properties of networks
that satisfy structural balance. That is, given a complete network, how can we
sign links (indicating positive and negative) such that for any triad of nodes in
network is structurally balanced. Cartwright-Harary Theorem (Cartwright and
Harary, 1956) provides answer to this question. It states that there are two
network structures that satisfy structural balance property: (i) all agents are

3
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friends (or links are positive) or (ii) agents are divided into two groups, and links
within groups are positive and links across groups are negative. In other words,
with respect to positive links, a network that satisfies structural balance will
be complete network or a network with two components that are cliques. With
respect to negative links, it will be either empty or a complete bipartite network.
Extending on Heider’s work, (Davis, 1967) argues that in many contexts we
may witness a situation in which all links in a triad are negative. To encompass
this type of configuration, he proposed the concept of weak structural balance.
The implication for the global structure now is an emergence of the additional
balanced network structure. With respect to positive links this is a network
with more than 2 components, and each component is a clique. With respect to
negative links it is a complete k-partite network.
There are number of empirical papers that support (weak) structural balance
in the real world networks ((Sytch and Tatarynowicz, 2013), (Szell et al., 2010),
(Antal et al. 2006), (Doreian and Krachardt, 2001)). On the theoretical side,
there is no micro-founded model that explains the emergence of such networks.
The exception is (Hiller, 2012) that provides a network formation model which
results with balanced networks. However the interaction between agents is modelled differently, as agents do not make decision how much to invest in negative
relations.
This paper provides a micro-founded model of network formation that produces weakly balanced networks as stable networks. Stable networks are always
weakly balanced networks (satisfy weak structural balance). The strong structural balance is satisfied in particular cases. It is important to note that the
structural balance is a concept concerned only with the sign of links, but does
not say anything about the intensities/weights assigned to links. Our model results with signed and weighted network, and thus provides implications beyond
structural balance theory.

2

Literature

The paper is related to the several different streams of literature which we review
in separate subsections.

4
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2.1

Games on a fixed network

The most often issues that arise when studying games on networks are multiplicity of equilibria (even in very simple games), and intractability of analysis due
to complexity of the interaction structure.
One way to deal with these problems is to try to characterize the equilibria
for specific classes of games. The representative papers that use this approach
include (Ballester et al, 2006). The main results of these papers are based on
established relationship between particular measure of centrality of an agent in
a network and actions taken in equilibrium. However, the results hold only for
games with specific payoff functions.
Another approach is to assume that players have incomplete information
about network structure, which can sometimes simplify the analysis. For example
(Galeotti et al., 2010) pursues this idea and characterize equilibria in games of
strategic substitutes and games of strategic complements.
The closest paper to ours is (Franke and Ozturk, 2009). Section 4 of this
paper is parallel to their results on conflict networks, and this section of the
paper can be seen as a generalization of their results. However they do not treat
the question of network formation at all, which is the central question of this
paper.

2.2

Network formation

The main interest of our paper is the model where agents not only decide how
much to invest in the bilateral contests but also with whom to get involved in
a contest. Thus the paper is related to network formation literature, of which
prominent examples are (Jackson and Wolinski, 1996), hereafter JW and (Bala
and Goyal, 2000)), hereafter BG.
The way to model dynamic process of network formation depends strongly
on the link formation protocol which is adopted. In JW type models, links
are formed bilaterally and destroyed unilaterally, while in BG type models links
are formed and destroyed unilaterally. The link formation protocol, of course,
depends on the interpretation of links. We propose a model in which the link
formation protocol does not coincide with any of the two mentioned above, since
the nature of links is fundamentally different. In our model links are formed
unilaterally and destroyed bilaterally (only if both agents agree to do so). This is
a natural link formation protocol, given that the links represent transfer contest.

5
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For example, to start a war it is enough that one party declares a war (or just
attack); while to make peace both parties must commit not o fight.
There is significant connection between the model considered in this paper
and other network formation models, as we are interested in the similar questions. However, this paper considers in some dimensions more complex model
since agents also make strategic decision on the investment in each link that
is created. This makes the paper close to the literature on formation of the
weighted networks, but also to the literature that jointly considers the network
formation and games on network.

2.3

Formation of weighted network

There is some work done on the formation of weighted networks. (Bloch and
Dutta, 2007) consider a model of formation of communication network where
agents derive positive benefits from the players with whom they are connected
to (both directly and indirectly). In their model, homogeneous agents have some
fixed endowment and they need to decide how to allocate this endowment in
establishing undirected links (with potentially different capacities) with others.
Links can be created unilaterally and the strength of the link is additively separable function of individual investments in the link, and convex in individual
investments. The convexity assumption in their model yields an incentive to
agents to concentrate their investments in a single link, which in the end makes
this model close to the two way flow BG model. (Deroian, 2006) extends this
model to the case of directed networks (BG one way flow case).
(Rogers, 2006) discusses two models of the network formation with endogenous link strength, depending on the direction of benefits flow along the links. In
’asking’ model (which is close to GB one way flow variant) agents receive benefits
trough the links they (unilaterally) create.
These models include the ’partner specific’ decision on intensity of the link
that is formed. That is, players jointly decide with whom they will be connected
and what will be intensity of that connection, which is feature shared with the
model considered in this paper. However, the payoff structure and nature of
externalities in these models is quite different than in model of network formation
considered in this paper.

6
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2.4

Contest games

Informally contest game is defined as follows. There are n players. The players
decide (simultaneously or sequentially) on the level of investment in the contest. The investments determine the probability of winning the (endogenous or
exogenous) prize according to Contest Success Function (CSF). An example is
lobbying where the prize can represent the value of a certain public policy that
need to be adopted.
There are two prominent ways to model CSF. The first is to assume that
the probability of winning is a function of ratios of efforts, which is introduced
by (Tullock,1980) and is approach that we use here. The second assumes that
probability of winning is a function of difference between effort levels and is
introduced in (Hirschleifer,1987).
A nice, albeit dated, overview of literature can be found in (Crochon, 2007)
and (Garfinkel and Skepardas, 2006). In this paper we consider transferable
contests as introduced in (Hillman and Riley, 1989) using the variant of Tullock’s
specification introduced by (Nti, 1997)
An alternative model, which is offered in the appendix, gives a model formulation as colonel Blotto game with Tullock CSF. There is a vast literature on
Blotto games and I will not review it here.

3

Bilateral contest game

In this section we introduce the bilateral contest game which will serve as a
building block of the model. There are two players, i and j competing over
a prize with exogenous size R. In order to increase the probability of wining,
players choose a non-negative action (effort, investment). The strategy space is
thus given with the set of non-negative real numbers R+
0 := [0, +∞) The effort is
transformed into contest specific resource (contest input) by means of function
referred here as a technology function. One can think of this function as an
analogue to the production function in a classic market setting. Here we assume
+
that technology function φ : R+
0 → R0 is function that satisfies the following
properties:
+
Assumption 1. Technology function φ : R+
0 → R0 is:

(i) Continuous and twice differentiable
(ii) increasing and (weakly) concave (φ0 > 0, φ00 ≤ 0)
7
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(iii) φ(0) = 0
The first two assumptions are standard, while the third one states that zero
effort implies zero contest input.
The actions determine the probabilities of wining the prize trough contest
success function. We choose Tullock ratio form specification of CSF suggested
in (Nti, 1997), assuming that the probability that player i when taking action
sij will win the contest against player j is given with:
pij =

φ(sij )
φ(sij ) + φ(sji ) + r

(1)

In (1) r ∈ R+
0 determines probability of draw (no player wins the prize). In the
paper we shall maintain the assumption that r is small.
Following (Hillman and Riley, 1989) we consider transferable contest game,
that is the game in which the prize is transfer from looser to winner. Assuming
fixed prize, payoff function of player i is given with
πij = pij R − pji R − c(sij )
where R is a transfer from loser to winner. We assume that (potential)
transfer from i to j is the same as a transfer from j to i, although of course in
+
general this does note to be the case. c : R+
0 → R0 is a cost function, and we
assume it to be twice continuously differentiable, increasing and convex.
The bilateral contest game has the unique (symmetric) NE equilibrium in the
pure strategies, which is interior for r low enough. In this case, the equilibrium
strategy of player i is defined with the following implicit function:
φ0 (s∗ij )R = (r + 2φ(s∗ij ))c0 (s∗ij )

4

Game on a fixed network

Let G = (N, L) be (undirected) network with set of nodes N and set of links
L. The nodes represent players, and link gij ∈ L indicates contest relation
between players. Let us also denote the set of neighbours of agent i as Ni , and
let di = |Ni | denote the degree of node i. Strategy space of a player i is a
di
set Si = R+
0 . A (pure) strategy of player i is di touple of levels investments
si = (sij1 , ..., sijdi ) ∈ Si . We assume that size of the transfer R is independent of

8

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper908

8

Huremovic: Rent Seeking and Power Hierarchies: A Noncooperative Model o

network structure and same for every contest gij 1 , and normalize R = 1.
Here we focus on the negative links. As we shall discuss in the section concerned with network formation, the absence of negative links can be interpreted
as a commitment not to initiate contest and thus a positive (friendly) link.
The payoff of player i is given with

πi (si , s−i G) =

X
j∈Ni

φ(sji )
φ(sij )
−
φ(sij ) + φ(sji ) + r φ(sij ) + φ(sji ) + r


− c(Ai )

(2)

P
where Ai = j sij is the overall investment, and s−i denotes strategies of
players other than i. Such specification of cost function generates externalities
between the contest that agent i is involved in, making it more interesting to
study this model on a network.
It is clear that payoff function πi is twice differentiable on its domain. Furthermore, the payoff function of player i is concave in si . To see this, note that
∂ 2 πi
(r + 2φ(sji )) (φ00 (sij )(r + φ(sij ) + φ(sji )) − 2φ0 (sij )2 )
− c00 (Ai ) ≤ 0
=
(r + φ(sij ) + φ(sji ))3
∂sij 2
∂ 2 πi
= c00 (Ai ) < 0 ∀j, k ∈ Ni
∂sij ∂sik
Above inequality holds given properties of function φ stated in Assumption
1, and since c is strictly convex. Thus, the Hessian Hi of function πi with respect
to si is the sum of diagonal matrix Hi1 with diagonal elements equal to:
(r + 2φ(sji )) (φ00 (sij )(r + φ(sij ) + φ(sji )) − 2φ0 (sij )2 )
<0
(r + φ(sij ) + φ(sji ))3
and matrix Hi2 which has all the elements equal to −c00 (Ai ) < 0. Matrix Hi1 is
negative definite and matrix Hi2 is negative semidefinite, thus Hessian Hi =
Hi1 + Hi2 is negative definite.
To be able to study network formation, we need to know if the equilibrium
strategies on a fixed network are uniquely determined. In this section we prove
the uniqueness of the equilibrium on the fixed network (this part is generalization
of similar result in (Franke and Ozturk, 2009))
We shall prove two propositions. The first states uniqueness and the second
1

We use gij when we talk about link gij ∈ L but also when referring to contest between
players i and j

9
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that gives conditions for equilibrium to be interior. The first proposition relies
on the results from (Rosen, 1965). For the sake of the presentation let us first
introduce the following definition:
Definition 1. A game is n persons concave game if (i) Strategy space of game
S is product of closed, convex and bounded subsets of m dimensional Euclidian
space, S = {S1 × S2 × ... × Sn |Si ⊂ E mi } 2 and (ii) payoff function of every
player 2 , ..., sn ), and concave in si ∈ Si , for each fixed value s−i ∈ S−i
n

Let us also introduce function σ : S ×R+
0 → R assigned to n persons concave
n
P
game given with σ(s, z) =
zi πi (s). Rosen’s results states that:
i=1

1. There exists a pure strategy equilibrium of n persons concave game
2. If function σ is diagonally strictly concave for some z ≥ 0 then the equilibrium point is unique
Proposition 1. There exists unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium of contest
game on a network.
Proof. As discussed above, the payoff function of every player i is continuous and
concave in si . Strategy space of is in general unbounded, but since the transfer R
is finite, and cost function c is strictly increasing, there will exit a point M ∈ R
such that c(M ) > R. No player will ever wish to exert effort larger than M , and
therefore we can bound the strategy space from above, and apply Rosen’s result.
Thus, considered game is n persons concave game as defined above. Following
(Rosen, 1965) there exist pure strategy equilibrium of the game. To prove the
uniqueness we will use the following specification of diagonally strictly concave
function proposed by (Goodman,1980), that states states that σ(s, z) will be
diagonally strictly concave if payoff functions are such that for every player i: (i)
πi (s) is strictly concave in si , (ii) πi (s) is convex in s−i and (iii)σ(s, z) is concave
in s for some z ≥ 0.
For the game that we are considering we have already shown above that πi
has a negative definite Hessian with respect to si
We also have that:
2

Rosen actually proved more general result when strategy space is ’coupled’, that is when
S ⊂ E m = E m1 × E m2 × ... × E mn is closed, convex and bounded set. Here we consider special
case when strategy space is ’uncoupled’

10
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∂ 2 πi
(r + 2φ(sij )) (2φ0 (sji )2 − φ00 (sji )(r + φ(sij ) + φ(sji )))
=
>0
∂s2ji
(r + φ(sij ) + φ(sji ))3
2

2

when there is link gij . Furthermore, (∀gjk ∈ L : k 6= i), ∂∂s2πi = 0 and ∂s∂jkπ∂si lt = 0
jk
for any other combination of players, j, k, l and t. Thus Hessian of πi with respect
to s−i is diagonal matrix with all entries positive or zero and therefore positive
semi-definite.
To prove concavity of σ(s, z) in s we choose r = 1. Then:

σ(s, 1) =

XX
i

j∈Ni

φ(sij )
φ(sji )
−
Ri − c(Ai )
φ(sij ) + φ(sji ) + r φ(sij ) + φ(sji ) + r


=−

X

c(Ai )

i

φ(s )

ij
appears exactly
The later equality holds since every summand φ(sij )+φ(s
ji )+r
once with positive sign (as a part of payoff function πi ) and exactly once with a
P
negative sign (as part of function πj ). Function − c(Ai ) is strictly concave

i

due to strict convexity of function c.
Proposition 2. The equilibrium is interior when r > 0 is small enough
Proof. Consider two arbitrary connected players i and j. Let us first prove that
in equilibrium it cannot be sij = sji = 0 ∀r > 03 . Assume otherwise. Then
the payoff for both players in contest gij will be 0. Consider the deviation of
player i from sij = 0 to sij = r Now the probability of wining for player i
φ(r)
= α > 0 and the probability of loosing will still be 0. This
becomes pij = φ(r)+r
deviation will be profitable as long as c(Ãi ) − c(Ai ) < α , where Ãi = Ai + r
As c is continuous, we can always find such r so that |c(Ãi ) − c(Ai )| < α when
|Ãi − Ai | ≤ r Therefore, for such r, it cannot be that sij = sji = 0 in equilibrium.
Let us now prove that for two arbitrary connected players i and j it cannot
be that sij 6= 0 ∧sji = 0 ∀r > 0. Again, suppose this is the case. that is the
case, then necessary conditions imply that in the equilibrium we have

∂πi
(r + 2φ(0))φ0 (sij )
rφ0 (sij )
0
|(sij,0 ) =
−
c
(A
)
=
− c0 (Ai ) = 0
i
2
2
∂sij
(r + φ(sij ) + φ(0))
(r + φ(sij ))

(3)

We omit ∗ with equilibrium actions in the rest of the proof, but it is clear when sij denotes
action in equilibrium
3

11
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We can always find r small enough such that (3) cannot hold for any value
sij > 0 and Ai > 0. Indeed, since the reward is finite and the number of nodes in
the network is finite, then Ai must be finite for any node i in arbitrary network.
For any cost function c ∈ C 2 satisfying assumptions for we can find U > 0 such
that c0 (Ai ) < U for every Ai . But we can always choose r > 0 small enough such
rφ0 (s )
rφ0 (s )
that (r+φ(sijij ))2 > U ∀sij ∈ [0, M ], since (r+φ(sijij ))2 → ∞ when r → 0 for any fixed
sij .
In what follows, we will assume that r is chosen in such way that interiority
of equilibrium is guaranteed. Note also that above results imply that the equilibrium of the game on a fixed network is defined with FOC system of equations.
Consider now two connected players i and j. The first order conditions that
characterize their behaviour in a contest gij are given with:



 

(r + 2φ(sij ))φ0 (sji )
(r + 2φ(sji ))φ0 (sij )
0
0
− c (Ai ) = 0 ∧
− c (Aj ) = 0 (4)
(r + φ(sij ) + φ(sji ))2
(r + φ(sij ) + φ(sji ))2
From (4) we get:
(r + 2φ(sji ))φ0 (sij )
c0 (Ai )
=
(r + 2φ(sij ))φ0 (sji )
c0 (Aj )

As φ0 > 0 and φ00 ≤ 0 and c00 > 0 we have: Ai > Aj ⇔
))φ0 (s

(5)
c0 (Ai )
c0 (Aj )

> 1 ⇔

(r+2φ(sji
ij )
(r+2φ(sij ))φ0 (sji )

⇔ sji > sij where last equvialence is due to the fact that φ is
increasing and φ0 is decreasing function.
This means that in the equilibrium a player with lower total spending will
win a contest with the higher probability. This observation reflects the fact
that more ’exhausted’ (one that spend more resources in equilibrium) player
performs worst in an contest, because the additional unit of resources is more
costly to him (his marginal costs are higher). Note that it does not necessarily
mean that player involved in more contests will have higher total spending in
the equilibrium, although the total spending is increasing in number of contests
(keeping everything else fixed). It will be rather a player who has many and more
intensive contests. Which contest will be more intensive, depends on the global
position of players in the network. Identification of the characteristic of a node
in network that would determine total spending of that node in the equilibrium
proved to be very challenging task. A property of a node that would determine
total spending in equilibrium is a nonlinear measure of centrality in a network.
12
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Finding such a measure, although interesting, is a very complex task.
The equation (5) gives us an additional interesting result. Each link gij has
a two actions assigned to it sij and sji , and we can interpret them as a weights
assigned to directed links i → j and j → i respectively. Then in equilibrium, for
any cycle (path starting and ending at the same node), we have 4 (we omit ∗ ):

c0 (A2 ) c0 (A3 ) c0 (An ) c0 (A1 )
φ(s12 ) φ(s23 ) φ(sn−1n ) φ(sn1 )
...
= 0
...
=1
φ(s21 ) φ(s32 ) φ(snn−1 ) φ(s1n )
c (A1 ) c0 (A2 ) c0 (An−1 ) c0 (An )
that is:
φ(s12 )φ(s23 )...φ(sn−1n ) = φ(snn−1 )φ(sn−1n−1 )....φ(s21 )

(6)

That is product of contest inputs assigned to some cycle is the same in both
directions.

5

Network formation

The fact that a player with a higher total spending in equilibrium looses in
expectation from a player with lower equilibrium spending, gives some hints on
how agents behave when contest are determined endogenously. But one must
note that the results from previous part are ex-post, and cannot be directly used
in a network formation model. This is because the fact that A∗i < A∗j in the
equilibrium on network G does not imply that we will still have A∗i < A∗j in the
equilibrium on network G + gij (where + denotes addition of the link gij to the
network). When a link gij is created, players i and j will, in general, change their
efforts in all other contests that they are involved into. This will, furthermore,
result with changes in equilibrium actions of all opponents of i and j in all of
their contests; all according to the system of nonlinear equations defined with
(4). Given the general structure of the network, one can see why the effects of
a link creation, which is a ’fundamental’ action of network formation game, are
in general case very hard to completely characterize. An example of the global
effects that addition of link causes in a very simple network is given in Appendix
B.
Because of the complex spillover effects we shall assume that agents are not
able to fully take into account these effects when making decision to create or
4

letting r → 0, but analogue result holds for any r as long as the equilibrium is interior

13
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severe a link. Informally, we assume that when deciding on creating or destroying
link, agents do not take into the account the complex adjustment in actions
that will occur in all other contests, given the change of the network topology.
Instead, they assume that all other actions in the network will remain constant
when making this decision. If the action is to create the link, the assumption is
that equilibrium efforts of that particular contest game will be according to the
NE of the bilateral contest game discussed above, keeping all other actions in
the network fixed.
We believe that the bounded rationality assumption here is more realistic,
and it makes the analysis more tractable.
In what follows we assume that r is sufficiently small, so that the equilibrium
of the game on fixed network is always interior. We shall also assume that φ is
identity mapping. However, all results hold when φ has a general specification
from the previous section.
We consider two coupled dynamics processes. The first, which happens on
the ’slow’ scale, governs the evolution of network topology. The second, on much
faster scale, is what we call the action adjustment process. It is the process that
describes how actions of players adjust to the new NE when network changes.
The reason for the second process is to be consistent with the assumption of
bounded rationality that we made in the network formation process.
Let us now be more precise. Time is indexed with t ∈ N ∪ {0}. In period
t = 0 an arbitrary contest network G(N, L) is given. 5 We say that network G
is in the actions equilibrium when all players play the equilibrium strategy of a
contest game on a fixed network described above.
Definition 2 (Actions equilibrium). A network G(N, L) is in actions equilibrium
if all actions sij and sji assigned to every link gij ∈ L are part of equilibrium of
a game on a fixed network.
Given the definition we can describe the dynamics process that we consider:
For every period t:
(i) At the beginning of period t the network from t − 1 is in the actions
equilibrium
5

Due to ’zero sum like’ nature of the game, the empty network will always be a stable in our
model. In order to describe the dynamic process that leads to the non-empty stable networks
we assume that, because of some non modelled mutation or a tremble the initial conditions are
given with the non-empty arbitrary network
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(ii) Random player i is chosen and she updates her links according to the link
formation protocol, resulting with network Gt+1
(iii) Second dynamic process (on the fast scale) starts, in which all agents update their strategies according to the process formally described in the
section 6 (better reply dynamics), until the actions equilibrium is reached
Steps (ii) and (iii) deserve some further explanation. First let us define the
link formation protocol.
Definition 3 (Link formation protocol). A link gij will be formed if player i or
j decide to form it. A link gij will be destroyed if both i and j agree to destroy it.
This means that the link formation is unilateral and the link destruction is a
bilateral action. It is the only natural to define a link formation protocol for the
antagonistic (purely competitive) relations in this fashion. A decision to start a
contest (i.e. war, litigation) is unilateral by nature, and the ’attacked’ player,
weather she decides to fight back or not, cannot change that. To make a peace
it is necessary that both parties agree to do it. This is the first paper to our
knowledge that considers such link formation protocol.
We assume that in each period t a random player can update his linking
strategy according to the link formation protocol defined above. Given this, we
define the stability concept, named Myopically stable network as follows:
Definition 4 (Myopically stable network). A network G = G(N, L) is Myopically stable network if for any player i and any two (possibly empty) sets of nodes
A ⊂ N and B ⊂ N .
πi (G + {gij }j∈A − {gij }j∈B ) > πi (G) ⇒ (∃j ∈ B) : πj (G − gij ) < πj (G)
πi (G + {gij }j∈A ) < πi (G)
This definition assumes that no player will wish to change her linking strategy
- destroy or create links. The possibility of replacing a link is essential for the
results, however it does not matter if a player can only replace one or more of
his links or destroy/create one or more links at the same time. The results will
(qualitatively) hold for example if we would consider a process in which an agent
in a single period can only crate a link, destroy a link or replace a link. That is
if we would consider the following definition of stability:
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Definition 5 (Myopically stable network - alternative). A network G = G(N, L)
is Myopically stable network if the following conditions hold:
πi (G − gij ) > πi (G) ⇒ πj (G − gij ) < πj (G) (∀i, j ∈ N )
πi (G + gik − gij ) > πi (G) ⇒ πj (G − gij ) < πj (G) (∀i, j, k ∈ N )
πi (G + gij ) < πi (G) (∀i ∈ N )
Let us now clarify what do we exactly mean when say that agents update
the connections myopically. When deciding on his connections agent i knows the
total spending of all players in the existing network. The effort levels (sij , sji )6
assigned to newly formed link are determined as the solution of a bilateral contest
game, keeping all other actions in the network fixed. To fix ideas, consider a case
of quadratic cost function c(x) = 12 x2 . When link gij is created the corresponding
actions sij and sji are determined as an equilibrium actions of a bilateral contest
game between players i and j keeping the spending of these two players fixed in
all other contest.
2sji − r
= (Ai + sij )
(sij + sji + r)2

∧

2sij − r
= (Aj + sji )
(sij + sji + r)2

Solution of this system is given with:

sij



q
2 + A0i A0i + A0j − 4 + (A0i + A0j )2
q
=
>0
0
0 2
2 4 + (Ai + Aj )

(7)

and symmetric for sji , where A0i = Ai − r/2. Player i will whish to form link
when :
sij − sji
+ A2i − (Ai + sij )2 > 0
(8)
(sij + sji + r)
and (sij , sji ) are determined with (7), and analogously for player j.
On the other hand, existing link ij will be destroyed if both players agree
to destroy it, that is when πi (si , s−i , G − gij ) > πi (si , s−i , G) and πj (sj , s−j , G −
gij )) > πi (sj , s−j , G)). This will be the case when:
A2i − (Ai − sij )2 −
6

sij − sji
sji − sij
≥ 0 ∧ A2j − (Aj − sji )2 −
≥0
(sij + sji + r)
(sij + sji + r)

We omit time index t
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A decision to destroy a link is, again, done assuming that all other actions
in the network will remain fixed. Creation and destruction of more links simultaneously is defined analogously. We additionally assume that player will create
link only if it is strictly beneficial to do so. If a player is indifferent between
keeping or destroying link, link will be destroyed. So, player prefers to have less
links. This could be justified by saying that there is some infinitesimal fixed cost
associated to maintaining the link, and easily included in the model. This tie
breaking rule does not affect the results.
If after some period t∗ no player wish to destroy or create link we say that
process has reached the steady state. Thus a network is stable if no player can
myopically improve his payoff by changing his linking strategy.
Consider a network G which is in a actions equilibrium. We can sort the nodes
in increasing order with respect to their total spending (A1 < A2 < ... < AK ),
K ≤ n where K is the number of different total spending levels in a network.
Note that we use Ai to denote both total spending of player i and the i − th
smallest level of total spending in network. From the context it will be always
clear what Ai stands for. Recall also that the equation (5) implies that in any
bilateral contest node that has a larger overall spending looses in expectation.
Denote with Ai the class of nodes that have total spending Ai . Let K ≤ n
denotes the number of classes in network G. When a player i ∈ N has a total
spending Ai we denote that as i ∈ Ai . We say that a player i has a control over
link gij if it is beneficial for player j to destroy a link gij . Thus, when a player i
is in control over a link it is completely up to him will the link be destroyed.
If Ai > Aj in the actions equilibrium we will say that player j is stronger
than player i or that player i is weaker than player j and will refer to Ai as a
strength of player i. It is clear that when i is stronger than j then i controls
link gij . Furthermore, both players i and j shall have control over link gij if this
link is not beneficial for them. A link gij is said to be beneficial for player i if
a creation of this link (if it does not exist) makes player i better off and if a
destruction of this link (if it does exist) makes player i worst off.
In what follows we provide a characterization of stable networks. We proceed
by stating and proving series of propositions and lemmas. Abusing the notation
s∗ −s∗
let πi (s∗ij , gij ) = (s∗ ij+s∗ ji+r) − c(A∗i ) denote the equilibrium payoff of player a from
ij
ji
link gab in actions equilibrium. Then the following holds:
Proposition 3. Let a ∈ Ai , b ∈ Aj , c ∈ Ak and i < j < k. Then s∗ab > s∗ac ,
s∗ba > s∗ca and furthermore πa (s∗ab , gab ) < πa (s∗ac , gac )
17
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Proof. Recall that FOC that determine s∗ab is given with. Recall that FOC for
any a, b contest are given as:
2s∗ab + r
2s∗ba + r
0
∗
=
c
(A
)
and
= c0 (A∗a )
b
(s∗ab + s∗ba + r)2
(s∗ab + s∗ba + r)2

(9)

Expressing s∗ab and s∗ba from (9) we get that, in equilibrium:
s∗ab =

2c0 (A∗b )
2c0 (A∗a )
r ∗
r
,
s
=
−
−
ba
∗ 2
∗ 2
0
∗
0
0
∗
0
(c (Aa ) + c (Ab ))
2
(c (Aa ) + c (Ab ))
2

(10)

0

2c (x)
r
The function f (x, y) = (c0 (y)+c
0 (x)2 − 2 is strictly decreasing in x as long as x > y
and strictly increasing when x < y. f is always strictly decreasing in y

∂f
2 (−c0 (x) + c0 (y)) c00 (x)
∂f
4c0 (x)c00 (y)
=
≶
0
when
x
≷
y
and
=
−
<0
∂x
∂y
(c0 (x) + c0 (y))3
(c0 (x) + c0 (y))3
This, together with (10) and A∗a < A∗b < A∗c implies that s∗ab > s∗ac and s∗ba > s∗ca .
To prove that πa (s∗ab , gab ) < πa (s∗ac , gac ) we use (10) and (after some algebra)
get:
s∗ − s∗
2c0 (Aa )
=1− 0
πa (s∗ab , gab ) = ∗ ab ∗ ba
(sab + sba + r)
c (Aa ) + c0 (Ab )
It is clear that πa is strictly increasing in Ab due to strict convexity of function
c. Thus, A∗c > A∗b > A∗a =⇒ πa (s∗ac , gac ) > πa (s∗ab , gab )
The previous proposition implies that the contest between two players who
are more equal in strength is more costly. A strong player spends less when
compete with weaker player and has highest payoff from that contest. The
results of this claim illustrates the incentive that strong player has to compete
with the weakest player, given that the transfer for every contest is the same.
This effect is self-reinforcing in the sense that it makes the weak player even
weaker, and thus more probable target for other strong players. For the sake of
the exposition let us state the following definition.
Definition 6. Player a ∈ Ai is an attacker (winner) if has has all of his links
with players from family of classes Ai = {Aj |j > i}. Player a ∈ Ai is mixed
type if there exist players b and c such that gab , gac ∈ G and Ab > Aa > Ac.
Player a ∈ Ai is victim(looser) if he has all of his links with players from classes
Ai = {Aj |j < i}
It is clear than every player a must be one of these types. Note also that
18
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in a stable network all attackers must have positive payoff. If this is not true
for some attacker a then, since he controls all of his links, he could profitably
deviate destroying his links.
Lemma 1. Let a ∈ A and A is the class of attackers. Let b and c be two nodes
in the network such that A∗b ≤ A∗c , gab ∈ G and gac ∈
/ G. Then the deviation of
player a such that he replaces contest gab with gac is payoff improving.
Proof. From (10) we have that sac in case of the deviation is given with:
s∗ac =

2c0 (A∗c + s∗ca )
r
−
∗
0
∗
∗
0
∗
∗
2
(c (Aa − sab + sac ) + c (Ac + sca ))
2

and we can write.
s∗ab =

2c0 (A∗b − s∗ba + s∗ba )
r
−
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
0
∗
0
2
(c (Aa − sab + sab ) + c (Ab − sba + sba ))
2

Because of the interiority of the equilibrium, A∗c +s∗ca > A∗c ≥ A∗b > A∗b −s∗ba . Since
A∗c + sca > A∗b the proposition 3 implies that this deviation is profitable.
From the previous lemma the we have directly get.
Corollary 1. If in stable network player a ∈ Ai has a link with player b ∈ Aj
then she has a link with every player c ∈ Aj+k k = 1, 2, ..K − j
Proof. Assume not. If link gab is not profitable for player a then, as noted before,
it is not profitable for player b. Then link gab cannot be part of a stable network.
So it must be that link gab is profitable for player a. Let c ∈ Aj+k be a node such
that link gac does not exist. Then, from the Lemma 1 the deviation of player a
such that she destroys link gab and creates link gac will be profitable.
Lemma 2. A stable network must be connected if not empty
Proof. Suppose not 7 . Then there are at least two components. Choose two
arbitrary components from the network and denote them with C1 and C2 . Let
two players with the highest total spending in these components as h1 ∈ Ac1
and h2 ∈ Ac2 . Assume, without lost of generality, that Ac1 ≥ Ac2 . Then, for any
player in that attacks player h2 (and there must be at least one) it is profitable
to attack player h1 instead.
From now on we always talk about connected network.
7

We omit ∗ , but it is clear from context that we are considering the equilibrium strategies
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Lemma 3. If in a stable network two players belong to the same class of attackers
A than they have the same neighborhood
Proof. Consider two nodes a, b ∈ A. Let us first prove that they must have equal
degree. Suppose that this is not true, so suppose, W.L.O.G., that db > da where
di denotes degree of a node i. Let Ni denote neighborhood of player i. It cannot
be that Na ⊂ Nb because then the total spending of a and b could not be equal
(they would not belong to the same class). If Na = Nb the proof is completed,
if not there must be some node h ∈ Na \Nb and some node k ∈ Nb \Na . Suppose,
W.L.O.G., that Ak ≥ Ah . Than it would be better for player a to replace link
gah with link gak according to the Lemma 1. This is profitable deviation which is
contradiction to the assumption that network is stable. So it must be da = db .
Let us now prove that there must be Na = Nb . Again, assume this is not
true. This means that we can find two nodes h ∈ Na \Nb k ∈ Nb \Na such that,
W.L.O.G., Ak ≥ Ah . But then it would be better for player a to replace link gah
with link gak according to the Lemma 1. Thus, network G cannot be stable. The
assumption that Na 6= Nb led us to a contradiction and thus must be rejected.
Since all attackers in the same class have the same neighborhood it must be
they have the same payoff in a stable network. Next Lemma shows that there
can be only one class of the winners (attackers) in equilibrium.
Lemma 4. There is only one class of attackers in a stable network
Proof. We again use the proof by contradiction. Suppose there are two different
classes of attackers and denote them with A1 and A2 and let A2 > A1 . Since
players in A1 and A2 are attackers they have control over all of their links. Since
Lemma 3 implies that all members of a same class of attackers have the same
neighborhood, we restrict our attention to the representative nodes a ∈ A1 and
b ∈ A2 . Let us first prove that it must be πa = πb . Assume this is not the case.
Then it must be that Na 6= Nb . Since A2 > A1 there are two possible situations
that we need to consider.
(i) Na ⊂ Nb then then if πa > πb player b could mimic player a (as he is
attacker), and if πb > πa the opposite will hold.8
(ii) Na 6⊂ Nb =⇒ (∃k ∈ Na \Nb ∧∃h ∈ Nb \Na ). But then, if Ak ≥ Ah Lemma
1 implies that b has a profitable deviation, and if not, same Lemma implies that
a has a profitable deviation.
8

Recall that we assume that when a player is payoff indifferent between two actions he
prefers to have less links.
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We have proved that in stable network it must be πa = πb . Since A2 > A1
then it must be that db > da or that the distribution of total spending a0 s and
b0 s opponents is different. We show that in both cases there is possible deviation
which makes one of the players better off.
Let us first consider the case when db > da . If Na ⊂ Nb we have (i) from
above. So there must exist nodes k ∈ Na \Nb and h ∈ Nb \Na . If Ak ≥ Ah then
player b would be better off by replacing contest gbd with gbc . If not, player a can
make analogue profitable deviation.
If da = db then, since A2 > A1 , the strengths (total equilibrium spending)
of a0 s opponents are different than strength of the b0 s opponents. Let q be the
strongest node from (Na ∪Nb )\(Na ∩Nb ) 6= ∅. If link gaq exists, then it is profitable
for a to switch from q to any node in the set Nb \Na . If gbq exists, then deviation
is switching from q to some node in Na \Nb , and the proof is completed.
Note that previous Lemma and corollary implies that members of (unique)
class of attackers are connected to all other nodes in the network. This is due to
the fact that class A2 must be a class of mixed types or losers. In either case,
previous lemma together with the fact that two players from a same class cannot
be connected in a stable network implies that all members of A1 and A2 are
connected.
Let us now say something about mixed types in stable network.
Lemma 5. In stable network all members of all existing mixed type classes A
are connected to all other nodes in the network except nodes belonging to their
class.
Proof. If there are only two classes of nodes in network A1 and A2 then there
are no mixed types. Suppose there are more than two classes in the network.
Consider first the strongest mixed type class (A2 ). A node m ∈ A2 must be
connected to all of the nodes in the class of winners A1 . This is because as a
mixed type m must be connected with at least one stronger player, which must
be a winner because of the choice of m. Lemma 4 implies then that m must be
connected to all players from the class A1 . Let us now prove that all members
of the class A2 have the same neighborhood. Suppose not. Let {m1 , m2 } ⊂
A2 ∧ Nm1 6= Nm2 . We have (A1 ⊂ Nm1 ∧ A1 ⊂ Nm2 ) =⇒ ((Nm1 /Nm2 ) ∪
(Nm2 /Nm1 )) ∩ A1 = ∅. Thus if they differ, neighborhoods of m1 and m2 must
differ only in the part where m1 and m2 have control over their link. It cannot be
Nm1 ⊂ Nm2 ∨ Nm2 ⊂ Nm1 because than it cannot be Am1 = Am2 . Consider two
21
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nodes, k ∈ Nm1 \Nm2 and l ∈ Nm2 \Nm1 . Note that sets Nm1 \Nm2 and Nm2 \Nm1
cannot be empty. If Ak ≥ Al then m2 has a profitable deviation switching from
gm2 l to gm2 k . If not, than m1 has analogue profitable deviation.
Let A3 be the third strongest class in the network. If this is the weakest class
(if K = 3) then, by definition, all players from m ∈ A2 must be connected to
some of the players of A3 , because otherwise they would not be mixed types.
Note that if player i ∈ A3 is connected to some player from class A2 that he is
connected to all players from class A2 since we have showed that all members of
class A2 have the same neighborhood. If there exist some player j ∈ A3 who is
not connected to a player from A2 than he is connected only to players from A1
but than it cannot be Ai = Aj , that is i and j cannot belong to the same class.
Thus, if K = 3 the claim holds.
If not than A3 is a mixed type class. Corollary 1 implies that all members
of A1 must be connected to all members of A3 since they are connected to all
the members of A2 and A2 < A3 . Suppose that there does not exist link gij such
that i ∈ A2 and j ∈ A3 . Since all players from A2 have the same neighborhood
there are no any links between members of class A2 and A3 . This means that
players from A3 loose only in contest with players from A1 , so they have control
over all of their links except those that connect them to players A1 . Furthermore,
A2 < A3 =⇒ Ni 6= Nj . As before, we consider first case when πi 6= πj .
(i) Ni ⊂ Nj then j can destroy links towards all players Nj /Ni and have same
payoff as i (if πi ≥ πj ), or player i can create links to all players in Nj /Ni (if
πi < πj )
(ii) Ni 6⊂ Nj =⇒ (∃k ∈ Ni \Nj ∧ ∃h ∈ Nj \Nh ). But then, if Ak ≥ Ah Lemma
1 implies that j has a profitable deviation, and if not, same Lemma implies that
i has a profitable deviation.
If πi = πj since A2 > A1 then it must be that dj > di or that the distribution
of total spending i0 s and j 0 s opponents is different. We show that in both cases
there is possible deviation which makes one of the players better off.
Let us first consider the case when di > dj . If Ni ⊂ Nj we have (i) from
above. If not we have analogue of (ii).
If di = dj then, since A2 > A1 , the strengths (total equilibrium spending)
of i0 s opponents are different than strength of the j 0 s opponents. Let q be the
strongest node from (Na ∪ Nb )\(Na ∩ Nb ) 6= ∅. If link giq exists, then it is
profitable for i to switch from q to any node in the set Nj \Ni . If gjq exists, then
deviation is switching from q to some node in Ni \Nj . We have showed that it
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cannot be that there are no links between A2 and A3 , thus every player from A2
is connected to every player from A3 .
Proceeding in the same manner we can show that all players from Ak must
be connected to all players from Ak+1 . Since number of nodes is finite, number
of classes is finite and this procedure reaches AK in finite number of steps9 .
Corollary 2. There is only one class of victims and all victims have same neighborhood
Let us say something about size of partitions in the stable network. Let |Ak |
denote number of nodes that belong to class Ak , the following lemma holds.
Lemma 6. |Ak | > |Ak+1 | ∀k ∈ {1, ..., K}
Proof. Suppose not. Note that FOC imply that s∗ij = s∗ih ∀{i, j, h} ∈ N ∧
P
{j, h} ∈ Al . If |Ak | < |Ak+1 | Lemma (previous) implies that Ak =
|Ai |ski
i6
=
k
P
and Ak+1 =
|Ai |sk0 i for any two nodes k ∈ Ak and k 0 ∈ Ak+1 . Recall that s∗ij
i6=k+1

is strictly decreasing in A∗i which implies that s∗kj > s∗k0 j ∀j ∈ {1, .., K}\{k, k 0 }.
Also, Ak < Ak+1 =⇒ skk0 > sk0 k . But then |Ak | < |Ak+1 | =⇒ (Ak =
P
P
|Ai |sk0 i ), contradiction! It must be |Ak | > |Ak+1 |
|Ai |ski > Ak+1 =
i6=k

i6=k+1

It is clear that |Ak | > |Ak+1 | is not sufficient condition for stability of network. The difference |Ak | > |Ak+1 | must be large enough so that members of
the stronger class do not find it payoff improving to delete links with members
of the weaker class. Previous Lemmas imply the following proposition, which is
the main result of this section.
Proposition 4. Stable network is either empty network or complete k-partite
with partitions of different sizes. The payoff of members is increasing in size of
the partition and total spending per node is decreasing with the size of partition
that she belongs to.
Complete k-partite network is the only network topology that satisfies weak
structural balance property, as discussed before. Note that if cost function is
too steep, or the transfer size is too small, the only stably network would be
complete bipartite network. The complete bipartite network (with respect to
negative links) is the only network topology that satisfies strong structural balance property.
9

If n is not finite the claim is easily proved using mathematical induction
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Not all complete k-partite networks will be stable. In order for them to be
stable, no player must have an incentive to create or destroy a link. As only
links that can be crated are between players from the same partition, no player
will wish to create link. This is because a link gij between players i and j such
that Ai = Aj = A cannot be profitable (they will exert the same effort in the
equilibrium and thus win and loose contest with the same probability, and since
the effort is costly, have a negative net payoff from contest gij ). No player will
wish to destroy a link if all links bring a positive payoff to a winner. Combining
equilibrium conditions for players i and j we get that in equilibrium 10


2sji
2c0 (Aj )
c0 (Aj )
0
sji ∧
=
c
(A
)
⇒
s
=
sij = 0
i
ij
c (Ai )
(sij + sji )2
(c0 (Ai ) + c0 (Aj ))2

(11)

Using (11) equality we can express sufficient conditions for stability of the network in terms of the total spending in the eqilibrium, that is we have that a
complete k-partite network will be stable when for any contest gij we have:
c0 (Aj ) − c0 (Ai )
> c(Ai ) − c
2 0
c (Aj ) + c0 (Ai )



2c0 (Aj )
(c0 (Ai ) + c0 (Aj ))2



Let us consider a particular example of complete bipartite network. Note
that in this case (due to symmetry) agents will play the same strategy in every
contest gij they are involved in. Then all the contest gij will result with positive
net payoff iff members of the larger partition have a (total) positive payoff in
equilibrium. Denote the two partitions with X and Y , and sizes of partitions
with x and y respectively, and let x > y. Then total efforts of members of two
partitions can be written as AX = ysX and AY = xsY , where si , i ∈ {X, Y } is
the equilibrium effort level in each particular contest of members of partition i.
Using (11) we get that:

πX (sX , sY ) > 0 ⇔ y

c0 (AY )
y + c(AX )
c0 (AY ) − c0 (AX )
−
c(A
)
>
0
⇔
>
(12)
X
c0 (AY ) + c0 (AX )
c0 (AX )
y − c(AY )

With cost function c(x) =

1 2
x,
2

sX =

√

r
√

x
√ 2
y ( x+ y )
√

Payoff of an agent from partition X is then:
√ 
x
x
−
y
−
xy
sX − sY
√
πX (sX , sY ) = b
− (bsX )2 =
√
sX + sY
x+ y
10

(13)

To simplify calculations we consider the case r → 0
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and from here
πX (sX , sY ) > 0 ⇔ x > y

√ !
3+ 5
2

(14)

We have proved the following proposition:
Proposition 5. For c(x) = 21 x2 and φ(x) = x a complete bipartite network will
√
be stable when x > y 3+2 5 where x and y are sizes of partitions.
Payoff of players in the larger partition will be increasing in the number
of members of own partition,
increasing in the number of players
in the
 and p

p
√
√
3
3
smaller partition for b ≤ 6b 14 + 1475 + 8 41 + 1475 − 8 41 ≈ 6.07b,
and decreasing otherwise. There are two effects on payoff of members of larger
partition when increasing the number of players in the smaller partition. The first
one is that the contests become more costly, as the members of smaller partition
become ’stronger’. The second effect is that there are more opportunities to
extract rents. Depending on which effect dominates, payoff of an agent from
larger partition will increase or decease with the size of partition.

6

Action adjustment process

As we have discussed in the section 3, after network structure is changed, players
update their strategies in a myopic way until the actions equilibrium on the new
networks is reached.In this section we describe this process and prove the it’s
global stability property. The actions adjustment process is defined as follows:
dsi
= α∇i πi (s), α > 0, i = 1, .., n
(15)
dt


∂πi
∂πi
∂πi
where πi (s) = πi (s1 , s2 , ..., si , ...sn ) and ∇i πi (s) = ∂si1 ∂si1 ... ∂sid is grai
dient of the payoff function with respect to own strategy. It is clear that Nash
equilibrium is steady state of this dynamics. We prove in what follows that NE
is globally asymptotically stable state of this dynamic system. Let us define
Q
Q
function J : i [0, M ]di → i [0, M ]di with:



∇1 π1 (s)


 ∇2 π2 (s) 


J(s) = 

...


∇n πn (s)

(16)
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Let us define matrix G as the Jacobian of matrix J with respect to s. We can
write system (16) in more compact form
ṡ = αJ(s)

(17)

To prove global stability we need to show that rate of change of ||J|| = JJ 0 is
always negative (and equal to 0 in equilibrium). So let us check dtd ||J||. We get:
d
JJ 0 = (Gṡ)0 J + J 0 Gṡ = (J 0 G0 J + J 0 GJ) = J 0 (G0 + G)J
dt
where G is he Jacobian of matrix J with respect to s. As proved in (Goodman,
1982) the conditions (i)-(iii) discussed in the proof of Proposition 1 imply that
(G0 + G) is negative definite. This implies that dtd JJ 0 < 0 which is what we need
to prove.
Thus if every player adjusts his action according adjustment process in (17)
we have that the process converges. The process (16) can be made discrete
without loosing the convergence properties. The discussion from above proves
the following proposition:
Proposition 6. The action adjustment process is globally asymptotically stable

7

Efficiency

It is easy to show that the unique network that maximize total utility of society
is the empty network. This is direct consequence of transferable nature of contest
game as the all rent seeking effort is wasteful. Indeed, total payoff that society
obtains from network G can be expressed as:

U (G) =

X

πi (si , s−i ; G) =

(18)

i

=

XX
i

j∈Ni


X
φ(sji )
φ(sij )
−
− c(Ai ) = −
c(Ai )
φ(sij ) + φ(sji ) + r φ(sij ) + φ(sji ) + r
i

From (18) we have:
Proposition 7. The efficient network is empty network
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8

Final remarks

A player will be stronger in equilibrium if his enemies are weaker(recall that we
refer to the total spending of a node in the equilibrium as strength of a player.).
The enemies a player (his first neighbours) will be weaker if they have stronger
opponents, which are, apart from player i, the second neighbours of player i,
and so on. That is, strong odd order neighbours (can be reached in path of
odd length) will make an agent weaker, while the opposite is true for even order
neighbours. The strength of a node i is thus endogenous, and intuitively can be
understand using the thought experiment from above. If this effect was linear,
the strength of a node would be a global linear centrality measure (like KatzBonacich centrality) but with negative decay factor β. In this model, although
the logic is similar, the strength of a node is a non-linear centrality of a node.
Characterizing this measure is, for this and similar models, a challenging task
for a future.
Replacing transferable contest with a ’classic’ contest (i.e. one in which players compete to get a larger share of a pie) would not change anything in terms
of existence and uniqueness results for a game on a fixed network. However, as
two types of contest have a different interpretation, the link formation protocol
in the formation model needs to be adjusted. Now it is not clear why should
link destruction be a bilateral decision, if a pie exist independently of contests.
Innovation contest/patent race is a situation which more natural to model in
this way (Baye and Hoppe, 2003). This approach could be naturally extended to
hypergraphs. For example, consider a situation in which there are n firms and m
markets (possible contests) in which firms can innovate. Then a linking strategy
of a firm would be to decide in which of these m contests to participate, creating
a hyperlink to other participants in these contests. The results for existence and
uniqueness will for a fixed hypernetwork will hold if we specify a contest success
function for market k as:
φ(sik )
pik = P
j∈(N k ) φ(sjk )
where N k is set of players competing in contest k, pik is the probability with
which i wins the contest k and rest of the notation is analogue.
The extension that we are currently working on is modelling positive links
explicitly, elaborating more on the role of the positive links. The preliminary
results indicate that if the effect of positive links is reducing marginal costs of
effort in contest, the qualitative results of the paper will not change.
27
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Appendix A
An alternative formulation
Suppose that instead of a general convex cost function, we have the Blotto type
game. That is, each player is endowed with equal amount of resources (time)
and the strategy is how to distribute the resources on different contest. Note
that this also define ’cost’ function to be convex, as resources are free up to some
point and then prohibitively costly.
P
So, suppose for simplicity j∈Ni sij = 1 ∀i, j. Keeping the same CSF we also
have that existence, uniqueness and interiority guaranteed by the (Rosen, 1965)
result. Let λi denotes Lagrange multiplier associated to the budget constraint
for agent i. Then FOC read (setting r = 0 for simplicity):
Consider now two connected players i and j. The first order conditions that
characterize their behaviour in a contest gij are given with (again assuming r is
small so the equilibrium is interior):

(r + 2φ(s∗ji ))φ0 (s∗ij )
− λi = 0
(r + φ(s∗ij ) + φ(s∗ji ))2
(r + 2φ(s∗ij ))φ0 (sji )∗
− λj = 0
(r + φ(s∗ij ) + φ(s∗ji ))2
X
s∗ik = 1
k∈Ni

X

s∗jk = 1

k∈Nj

and from here, we get:
(r + 2φ(s∗ji ))φ0 (s∗ij )
λi
=
∗
∗
(r + 2φ(sij ))φ0 (sji )
λj

(19)

Thus role of λi is analogous to the role of A∗i . Higher A∗i implied higher
marginal cost of additional unit of effort, and λi is the shadow price of the
resource for player i in this formulation.
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Appendix B
Let us consider the following example to illustrate the complexity of global ef-

6

1

4

3

5

2

fects in the network.

Calculating the equilibrium action (using the action adjustment proceess algorithm based on the results from section()) we get that matrix of the equilbrium
efforts S is given with:






S=






0
0.289 0.289 0.286
0
0

0.292
0
0.292
0
0
0.269 

0.289 0.289
0
0
0.286
0 


0.350
0
0
0
0.354
0 

0
0
0.350 0.354
0
0 

0
0.479
0
0
0
0

And the assigned payoffs are:
π = (−0.854, −0.999, −0.854, −0.395, −0.395, 0.050)
Deleting link g13 we get a network with
1
4

6

2

5
3
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and







S̄ = 






0
0.351
0
0.354
0
0

0.290
0
0.290
0
0
0.270 

0
0.351
0
0
0.354
0 


0.353
0
0
0
0.353
0 

0
0
0.353 0.353
0
0 

0
0.480
0
0
0
0

and payoffs
π = (−0.402, −1.193, −0.402, −0.501, −0.501, 0.048)
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